The biggest political event for conservatives in the last decade was Donald Trump’s slow trip down the escalator. But maybe the second biggest was the swift rise of what’s often been called the “new right.”

　　Though that collection has been understood as a hodgepodge of populists, nationalists, neo-mercantilists, post-liberals, and Catholic integralists, the components have been connected by a frustration with the conservative establishment’s libertarianism and inability to solve a host of longstanding social and economic challenges.

　　Like all political insurgencies, the new right came on the scene with great energy and even more ambition. The movement quickly attracted attention (muchofitcritical) as well as adherents (oftenyoungandbrash). A decade on, we should assess its influence. I’ll leave the political and electoral analysis to others. But in terms of at least one critical area of policy thinking—the ideas related tofamilyandcommunity—its best, most responsible thinkers deserve two cheers out of three. And this is coming from someone who’s beenoccasionallycriticalof thenew right.

　　At its best, the new right got two important things correct. First, it elevated issues that had been ignored or deprioritized for too long, like the negative effects of globalization, the deterioration of families, the loss of solidarity, the struggles of men and boys, and the suffering of forgotten communities. Second, it was rightly unsatisfied by more traditional conservatives’ reflexive view that policy couldn’t or shouldn’t get involved in some matters: Many libertarian-leaning conservatives were wary, for instance, of meddling with free markets and free trade, inviting the state into family life, and taking positions that might be considered questions of individual freedom.

　　What the new right got wrong was its affinity for a muscular state. It was too willing to use government might to accomplish its goals. Because it was so concerned about the condition of the family, it forgot—or maybe its younger members never knew—some of the key lessons of American conservatism: Economic tinkerers are never as smart as they think they are. A powerful government that’s your best friend today may be your worst enemy later. The state is unavoidably slow, expensive, and clumsy. Uniform diktats from the central government quickly run afoul of American pluralism. A bossy Uncle Sam pushes aside civil society and closer-to-home governing.

　　Now, most of the new right was never socialist, much lessfascist. But some of its numbers seemed at least statist-curious. Right-of-center intellectuals associated with the post-liberal movement, including Patrick Deneen and Adrian Vermeule, declared liberalism (arguably the strongest philosophical case for a limited government)a failureand castigated itshorrorof authoritative direction and obedience. More fringe elements like Costin Alamariu (a.k.a. Bronze Age Pervert) seemed todelightin theprojectionanduseof force. But more mainstream, policy-oriented writers alsoregularlyreferredto “zombieReaganism,” an insult aimed at the old right’s ostensibly antiquated, undying adoration for small government.

　　As it relates to family policy, someon the new right embraced nationalindustrialplanningin an attempt to protect blue-collar jobs and strengthen middle-income families. Others thought it was a good idea for the federal government to hand out free money to those with kids even if the parents didn’t want to work (“child allowances”)—a proposal inconceivable to older conservatives who had fought to include work requirements in welfare programs. Others were receptive to even more aggressive Hungary-style family policies, including subsidies to the newly married, housing and transportation supports, forgivable all-purpose loans, family allowances, and more. All of the above would strengthen the hand of Washington and draw families closer to the central state. That is quite different than, say, the subsidiarity-style approach that I favor—in short, using local and state governments far more than the federal government, and using policy to capacitate communities and civil society, not to connect individuals and families to Uncle Sam.

　　Despite the new right’s regrettable state-friendly approach, they deserve kudos, or at least grace, for three reasons.

　　First, the post-Nixon GOP had mostly viewed government with suspicion. Although conservatives’ tax-cutting and bureaucracy-fighting muscles got plenty of exercise, the muscles needed to develop and implement policies that smartly use government power had atrophied. Young conservatives simply never got much experience learning how to mobilize state authority to get things done while respecting limiting principles like federalism, localism, capitalism, and deference to civil society. Once the new right rejected their conservative predecessors’ government-lite proclivities, they saw a strong state as a possible ally. In this way, we might understand the new right’s early forays into policy development as less wrongheaded than green—they had good instincts and admirable passion but needed some seasoning.

　　Second, the new right helped change the conversation. I run afellowship programon conservatism and governing, and our curriculum includes a good bit of material from the conservative revival of the 1950s. It is remarkable how seldom the authors of that era, like RussellKirkand FriedrichHayek, mention family and community. In fact, the famous “Sharon Statement,” authored by William F. Buckley and other young conservatives in 1960, never even mentions the words “family” or “community.” The home and voluntary associations were so strong in that era—and the threat of communism and socialism so grave—that little thought was given to using state power to shore up the mediating levels of society.

　　Conservatives need to think in terms of strengthening life’s smallest but most important associations—those built on relationships among parents, children, neighbors, educators, local volunteers, residents of towns.

　　It is true that family and community were front and center for RobertNisbet, communitarian conservatives likePeter Berger and Richard John Neuhaus, and the mid-2010s “reform conservatives.” But their ideas got too little traction policy-wise. But something interesting and important happened after the new right’s agitation. In 2023, a group of “freedom conservatives” released astatement of principlespivoting from and invoking the influence of the Sharon Statement more than 60 years earlier. Thisgroupof “conservatives, libertarians, and classical liberals” emphasized the importance of family and community in their second bullet out of ten. “Most individuals are happiest in loving families, and within stable and prosperous communities in which parents are free to engage in meaningful work, and to raise and educate their children according to their values.”

　　In 2023, whenNational Reviewissued a statement of itspriorities, it too put family and community near the front of the line. A section titled “Moral Bedrocks” includes, among other things, statements such as “The traditional two-parent family is the most basic building block of our society” and “Community is a guard against atomized individualism and a source of countless other social goods.” The Heritage Foundation’s “Project 2025” also elevated these issues. For example, itsintroductionoccasionally reads like a communitarian manifesto, and itschapteron the Department of Health and Human Services sets as a goal “promoting stable and flourishing married families.” All of these are simpatico (on the prioritization of family and community) with the new-right statement of 2022 by “national conservatives,” which, among other things, lauded the family as the source of society’s virtues and foundation for its achievements.

　　This is not to say that the new right caused other conservatives to suddenly care about these matters. Obviously, they already did. But often the greatest contribution of upstart political movements is galvanizing support for particular positions; that is, they influence the world by getting those in the mainstream to adjust their language and priorities. The new right deserves some credit for getting others to talk more about family and community.

　　Third, there’s not been a more important moment in the last generation than now for conservatives to have energy and backbone on these issues. American marriage and fertility rates are at or nearall-time lows. Too many kids grow up outside of two-parent families. Boys continue to struggle in school, and men continue to struggle with labor force participation and deaths of despair. We are headed the wrong way on “victimless crimes” like gambling, drug use, and pornography. Our civil-societygroupscontinue to deteriorate, especially inhard-pressed areas. For these reasons, conservatives need to think in terms of strengthening life’s smallest but most important associations—those built on relationships among parents, children, neighbors, educators, local volunteers, residents of towns, and so on. The new right has encouraged that thinking.

　　It may seem terribly strange for me to focus on this government-friendly, communitarian branch of conservatism at the very moment the Trump administration—via DOGE—is slashing at the federal government in ways that make libertarians smile. Though Mr. Trump’s personal relationship withfamilyandcommunitymay becomplicated, many of his administration’s leaders care about these matters. Vice President Vance came to fame for hismemoirabout broken families and communities, and he’sspokenoutregularlyabout the need to use policy to strengthen both. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy wants his department toprioritizefamily-friendly communities when awarding grants. Labor Secretary Lori Chavez-DeRemer has a pro-union record, which may well appeal tothose on the rightwho think organized labor can be good for families andthe community. Whatever one makes of any of these specific policies, it is good that family and community are officially part of the conversation.

　　It is possible that we’re witnessing the emergence of a smart, successful conservative movement and governing agenda related to family and community. Though attention has focused on recent energy and proposals, much can be mined from previous generations. Though decades old,The Quest for CommunityandTo Empower Peopleshould be required reading for the right. The 2010sReformoconswere yearsaheadof their time. Returning to evergreen concepts likesubsidiarity,localismandconservativesocialentrepreneurialismwill generate fresh insights.

　　I think the new right deserves credit for nudging the older right in this direction. The excesses of some corners of that movement, however, keep me from saying, “We’re all the new right now.” But I would say that today’s burgeoning version of conservative communitarianism is traditional thinking leavened by the new right’s verve.