As the Russian invasion of Ukraine drags into its third year, there are reports from credible sources that North Korean troops are fighting for Russia. Russian President Putin has consciously avoided imposing the full costs of this conflict onto the upper and middle classes of his country, particularly in Moscow and St. Petersburg. He has chosen instead to call in favors from his allies for cannon fodder, and this has trickled in all the way from the outlying parts of Russia and now from arguably the worst country on earth and one long beholden to Russia, North Korea.

　　Military cooperation between Moscow and North Korea dates back to the end of World War II when the Soviets re-armed their comrades in the northern part of the peninsula, which helped precipitate the Korean War. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, we now know that Stalin and the Soviets were not only arms suppliers to the North Koreans; they were also encouraging the regime to attack and continue the war, extending its violence and destruction to fit the USSR’s global goals and ends.

　　So it is not at all a coincidence that North Koreans are now dying for another Russian geographic expansion, but I think that it might be very useful for the West to consider the case of Korea when we think about the conflict in Ukraine. The fallout from the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, both of which are now widely viewed as failures, have tainted the case of American intervention abroad, and of course the shadow of Vietnam still looms large over American foreign policy. But interestingly, Korea is rarely mentioned by hawks or doves, even though it bears a remarkable resemblance to the Ukraine conflict, and offers a different lesson than those widely cited as foreign policy failures.

　　Similar to the conclusion of the Korean War, in Ukraine it increasingly looks as if both sides will have to accept something neither wanted—a divided country (although one can perhaps argue Russia will get more of what it desired albeit several significant, embarrassing failures along the way). This division will obviously come at an extremely high material, psychological, and existential cost to Ukraine and Ukrainians, but it will end the war. And perhaps most importantly, it will give Ukraine the opportunity to achieve the same economic and political miracle that South Korea accomplished while living side-by-side with a totalitarian regime.

　　Beginning with Washington’s Farewell Address, there has been a long line of American political thought that argues for a much less active US foreign policy. And certainly our recent experiences in places like Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan to steer previously totalitarian, anti-American regimes towards freer and more open societies have much to do with that now increasingly popular view. Those interventions were in countries that lacked the popular will or basic capacity to improve their governance and economic performance. And yet the US is not very much involved in Ukraine, albeit without boots on the ground. If we wish to avoid a similar embarrassment to the one the US experienced as we rushed out of Afghanistan, we might well consider whether there is any hope of making Ukraine a better place in the long term, considering the enormous economic resources we have invested there.

　　We all bring an ideological lens to these discussions, and if one clips the data from Vietnam to the present, it does look as if the US is unable to do much good by intervening. World War II is one of those cases that still stands the test of time (despite Tucker Carlson’s best efforts). But what exactly are we to make of Korea?

　　South Korea is an undeniable success in the history of American foreign policy. That should give us hope for Ukraine.

　　The ground-level contexts look strikingly similar. The Korean peninsula and the Ukraine/Russian frontier and cultures were both historically fluid and without sharp distinctions. Odessa was and is neither Russian nor Ukrainian, and even today, many on both sides of the 38th parallel would like to see a unified Korea; they have essentially shared languages and had long-standing religious and ethnic ties. Pushing the comparison even further, throughout Korea there were many individuals in the south and north who supported the idea of a collective society, just as in Ukraine there was much more sympathy for Russia prior to the invasion.

　　One side in each conflict had recently gone through an extensive military upgrade and sensed weakness in their targets. The North Koreans had received Soviet armor and aircraft giving them a technological advantage over their cousins to the South. In the lead up to the Ukraine invasion, the Russians had recently completed a very public project of allegedly modernizing their military, which they seemed anxious to display to the world against a target.

　　Globally, the East and West were both sending very mixed and easily mistaken signals to each other prior to the Korean and Ukraine wars. Recall the various analysts, journalists, and politicians who swore Russia would not invade Ukraine even as troops were massed on the border? Advocates of non-interventionism now claim that the US had been provocative, but many in the US were bewildered to discover that the Russians believed this. Clearly not everyone was on the same page.

　　The same was true in Korea. The US had internally and publicly spent little time worrying about a communist action on the peninsula and the US was in the midst of winding down its military, although a hawkish wing of the foreign policy establishment was looking for a reason to reverse that stance. They were about to be given a strong argument for rearmament.

　　Both wars began in a similar fashion with the aggressors enjoying early and seemingly invincible successes. The Russians marched to Kiev and the North Koreans punched past the 38th parallel conquering Seoul and essentially isolating the remnants of the South Korean military and the initial flow of US troops in a tiny area on the southern tip of Korea. In both instances, the conventional wisdom was that the winning side would complete its victory in no time and resistance was both futile and wasteful.

　　And yet, neither conflict has ended as it began. From the moment President Zelensky in Ukraine (who shares a number of personality traits with former South Korean president Syngman Rhee) uttered his famous line about not needing a ride but a gun and some ammunition, the Russians began to suffer numerous public setbacks. In Korea, the audacity of General MacArthur, along with Western aid and military assistance, eventually stemmed the North Korean advances, along with bravery and tremendous sacrifices by the two nations that were attacked. While the initial resistance of the South Korean military was feeble and futile as the war progressed, they became more professional and stouter. Surprisingly, the South Korean military today is widely viewed as superior to the conventional forces in the North.

　　Over the past several years, we have seen the Ukrainian military and intelligence forces essentially revolutionize modern warfare. Whether it was their early, wildly successful embrace of drone warfare or their bold strikes into Russia itself, the Ukrainians have shown themselves to be worthy, if outnumbered, adversaries.

　　Intervention should be a last resort, but we have to accept that US support for regimes fighting off totalitarianism has had some success.

　　While both the Ukrainians and international forces in South Korea would reverse their initial losses and push well into the captured territory and even into the aggressor’s land, both wars have settled into bloody grinds. In the remarkably sad case of Korea, this coincided with a protracted negotiation over prisoner exchanges and the specifics of the settlement to the conflict. That delay cost tens of thousands of lives.

　　Of course, merely identifying parallels and comparisons doesn’t really tell us much about how the Ukraine conflict will end or how the next several decades will go for its social, political, and economic future. But because of the stunning natural experiment between North and South Korea, we can say a few things.

　　First, it’s entirely possible that Ukraine can regroup, rebuild, thrive, and prosper. Negotiating for its safety and autonomy will be critical, and either NATO or the US will have to guarantee that security for this to work. That’s no small ask, but the case of Korea shows that it is possible. Korea has grown into a mature, albeit quirky, democracy and a showcase for economic development and cultural success. Ask any young person to name their favorite K-Pop band or K drama and you’ll be surprised by the diversity of the answers. South Korea is an undeniable success in the history of American foreign policy. That should give us hope for Ukraine.

　　Second, Ukraine may have had a shared and somewhat warm view of Russia throughout its history, but today those feelings are buried in the rubble of destroyed buildings and the blood shed by its people. The war has made Ukraine a more unified nation, and one that needs a chance to recover and see what it can do unburdened by a war against a much larger and more powerful neighbor. While the US may want this war to end, we did lengthen it. I would argue Ukraine has earned the right to at least try to build a freer, democratic, pro-market country under the rule of law. The Ukrainians have sacrificed more than enough for that opportunity.

　　And while many of us who support liberty are right to be skeptical about the ability of the US and its military to reshape the world, in some instances, it has made things “better.” World War II was catastrophic for Europe and Japan, and yet those two parts of the world have been lynchpins for freedom and the Western way of life. In Korea, the South is clearly a successful experiment, especially when compared to the prison camp on its northern border. Even the former Yugoslavia is now peaceful after the US and UN helped facilitate a complicated, bloody transition.

　　It’s not clear how well Ukraine will do after this war ends, and how long its current leadership will survive. But with some sort of a security commitment from the West, reconstructing Ukraine might very well work. Weve seen it work under equally challenging circumstances. Intervention should be a last resort, but we have to accept that US support for regimes fighting off totalitarianism has had some success. Even direct military intervention is not always a messy failure. We shouldn’t ignore all of the evidence merely to satisfy our priors. We do so at the risk of errors and the costs of millions who would otherwise live under tyranny and oppression. That’s an empirical, not a normative statement. Using a more rational approach might help us stem the bloodshed and promote the development of a better regime in Europe. The war should end, but perhaps that really is just the beginning.