The rapid rise in popularity of democratic socialism has generated a significant amount of commentary. Most of it has focused on its advocates’ substantive policy demands. Many may not realize that institutional structure has also featured prominently in the new socialists’ rhetoric. Titled “Workers Deserve More,” the 2026 Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) platform argues that the United States Constitution needs major structural changes. The DSA, led by co-chairs Ashik Siddiqu and Megan Romer, recommends replacing “the President and the Supreme Court with an executive and judiciary chosen by and subordinate to Congress” and that Congress itself be transformed into a unicameral body (they would “abolish the Senate”) expanded to accommodate “proportional representation.” The Constitution’s complex separation of powers system is inefficient, they contend, and poorly reflects the will of the American people.

　　While these DSA calls for substantial constitutional change might seem fresh or shocking, on the 250th anniversary of Pennsylvania’s 1776 constitution, we do well to remember and reflect upon the fact that Americans have tried them all before—with results that hardly recommend them today.

　　A Revolutionary Constitution

　　Before declaring independence, the Second Continental Congress implored states in 1776 to prepare for a new era of self-government by drafting their own constitutions. Pennsylvanians saw an opportunity to design a more democratic society that took popular sovereignty seriously. Long controlled by wealthy eastern merchants (many of whom were politically powerful Quakers), Pennsylvania’s colonial charters had kept these elites in power through a £50 property requirement to vote and strict rules for naturalization. A majority of settlers to Pennsylvania’s middle counties were Lutheran or Reformed Protestant German immigrant farmers; Scotch-Irish Presbyterians populated the western edge of the Commonwealth. These western farmers were nearly equal parts financially indebted to and resentful of wealthy eastern merchants, especially those in the apparent national seat of power in Philadelphia.

　　At the time of independence, common militiamen seized political control of the Commonwealth; these so-called “Associators” were radically egalitarian and committed to ousting traditional leaders (especially Quakers) from political office. A network of extra-legal committees of correspondence, revolutionary cells opposed to both British authority and Pennsylvania’s traditional ruling classes, assembled a constitutional convention in Carpenters Hall in Philadelphia on July 15, 1776—just minutes down the road from Independence Hall. Ninety-seven men assembled that day, many of whom had no political experience, much to the delight of the Associators. Delegates soon elected arguably the most famous Pennsylvanian of all to preside over the drafting of their new governing document: Benjamin Franklin.

　　Associators at the convention—a group that included George Bryan (abolitionist, bankrupt merchant, and future president of Pennsylvania), James Cannon (professor of mathematics and future justice of the peace), Timothy Matlack (brewer, scribe of the Declaration of Independence, and disaffected Quaker who supported American Revolution), and David Rittenhouse (surveyor, astronomer who charted the transit of Venus, and future PA treasurer)—forged a constitution that broadened the electorate to include all freemen who had paid any tax and who had lived within the state for at least one year. Roughly two-thirds of men could vote in Pennsylvania under the old colonial property requirement; 90 percent of “freemen” over 21 qualified under the 1776 Constitution—a figure that, constitutionally at least, appeared to include free black men as well.

　　Anti-Quaker sentiment ran high. Leading Quakers had additionally alienated themselves from the Associators due to the former’s preference for seeking peaceful solutions to the conflict with Great Britain; Quakers’ religious scruples prevented them from taking sides in armed conflict or from recognizing revolutionary governments established through extra-legal means. Quakers also objected to oath-taking. The Associators wrote into their constitution’s Declaration of Rights that “all free men having a sufficient evident common interest with, and attachment to the community,” they therefore had a right to elect public officials, making explicit one of the implications of the Declaration of Independence—the consent of the governed through popular sovereignty. Associators, however, wanted proof of a man’s “common interest with” and “attachment to” their community.

　　Delegates to Pennsylvania’s constitutional convention were required to swear oaths renouncing all ties to Great Britain and its king and declaring their faith in Christ Jesus, divine Son of God. The finished constitution itself included a distinct oath required for legislators, a designated oath of allegiance to the Commonwealth, and a separate oath of office for all officials. This was a constitution that sought to disenfranchise those who didn’t share beliefs with the new orthodoxy—in this case, by targeting a particular religious group.

　　Pennsylvanians ultimately realized that the process of government is almost as critical to America’s success as the substance of government.

　　Pennsylvania’s constitution established an annually elected unicameral legislature that also wielded control over the executive insofar as it chose a president annually via a joint ballot with a separately elected executive Council—the executive power was vested in a “president and [a 12- member] council,” effectively a plural executive that had no veto on legislative activity. Legislators exercised even more control over the judiciary: representatives could easily remove judges before their terms expired. There was an independent Council of Censors, whose duty it was to “enquire whether the constitution has been preserved inviolate in every part; and whether the legislative and executive branches of government have performed their duty as guardians of the people” and recommend that the legislature repeal unconstitutional acts or call a new constitutional convention, but power predominantly lay in the legislature.

　　The Pennsylvanian Experiment

　　Instead of presenting this constitution to the people for ratification, the convention declared the constitution immediately operational on September 28, 1776. The effects of freeing the legislature from bicameralism, executive oversight, and judicial repercussions were swiftly apparent. In September 1776, legislators earned 8 shillings per day; in March 1777, they gave themselves their first pay raise, increasing their daily earnings to 15 shillings. By December 1777, they increased that rate to 25 shillings per day.

　　By June 1777, the legislature had begun penalizing Pennsylvanians who refused a state loyalty oath (which included promising to turn over to authorities their fellow citizens for “treasons or traitorous conspiracies”): those refusing the oath were held “incapable of holding any office or place of trust in this state, serving on juries, suing for any debts, electing or being elected, buying, selling or transferring any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, and shall be disarmed.” They ordered that “every male white inhabitant” over sixteen “who may be suspected of being unfriendly to the freedom and independence of the United States” shall be “upon information on oath or affirmation of one or more witnesses to any justice of the peace within this state be forthwith under warrant brought before [a justice]” and held in custody “without bail” until they take the oath. Legislators affirmed and expanded this act in October.

　　Despite initially gaining admirers, many Americans feared Pennsylvania’s democratic experiment. Georgia and Vermont copied unicameralism and annual elections, and several provisions of the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, including its robust defense of states’ rights, found their way into other state constitutions and eventually the Bill of Rights. But angry Pennsylvanian Benjamin Rush, who penned a scathing critique of Pennsylvania’s unicameral legislature, recalled that John Adams’ reaction to the constitution had been: “Good God! the people of Pensylvania in two years will be glad to petition the crown of Britain for reconciliation in order to be delivered from the tyranny of their constitution.” Adams would lead efforts to create a constitution for Massachusetts in 1780, learning in part from the experiences in Pennsylvania. The Massachusetts document established a bicameral legislature and featured strong separation of powers provisions which included an independent judiciary. Unlike what happened in Pennsylvania, the people of Massachusetts would also popularly ratify their constitution.

　　Rush lamented that “we are told, that the perfection of every thing consists in its simplicity. … A despotic government is the most simple government in the world, but instead of affording security to property, liberty or life, it obliges us to hold them all on the simple will of a capricious sovereign. I maintain, therefore, that all governments are safe and free in proportion as they are compounded to a certain degree, and on the contrary, that all governments are dangerous and tyrannical in proportion as they approach to simplicity.” Associators had claimed that a simple government was safest for the common man, that complicated institutions hindered collective pursuit of the common good. Rush argued that Pennsylvania’s “simple” government would lead, contrary to what Associators intended, to control by wealthy tyrants (who alone had the money to finance annual campaigns) who would see in the powerful legislature an easy opportunity to bend politics to their wills. “The consequence of a majority of rich men getting into the legislature is plain,” Rush wrote. “Their wealth will administer fuel to the love of arbitrary power that is common to all men.”

　　The lack of institutional friction allowed for, as James Madison put it, a “multiplicity,” a “mutability,” and an “injustice” of laws that included unilaterally seizing lands granted by the crown to William Penn’s heirs, vesting these lands “in the commonwealth of Pennsylvania for the use and benefit of the citizens” (1779). Fears of radicalism in Pennsylvania contributed to the constitutional crisis surrounding the failure of the Articles of Confederation (which also sported a unicameral legislature, albeit one much weaker in terms of what it could accomplish), and contributed to calls for a new constitutional convention, both locally and nationally. Traditionalists such as James Wilson, who objected to Pennsylvania’s lack of meaningful separation of powers for the long-term preservation of liberty, eventually gained control of the state government, demanding the repeal of the loyalty oaths and attending laws paired with distinct independent branches of government. Pennsylvania’s first constitution remained in operation until 1790, when it was replaced by another that institutionally resembled Massachusetts’ 1780 Constitution (and the US Constitution).

　　Two hundred and fifty years later in 2026, we might reflect that Pennsylvania’s constitutional experiment did in fact grease the wheels of government. Legislation came fast, sometimes to the delight of the people and sometimes for the benefit of the Commonwealth—in 1780, for example, Pennsylvanians passed a historic, first-of-its-kind law for the gradual abolition of slavery. Yet the lack of institutional checks on the legislature also encouraged hyper-partisan behavior. Without restraint, the legislature quickly became a tool to oppress minorities and political opponents. Violence erupted in the streets as factional disagreements drew blood. Pennsylvanians ultimately turned from this system in favor of one that promised more long-term stability, realizing that the process of government is almost as critical to America’s success as the substance of government.