Should virtue be a consideration in judicial decisionmaking? Indiana Law Professor R. George Wright makes an intriguing argument for why the four cardinal virtues could be useful in interpreting constitutional cases:

Judges typically decide constitutional cases by referring to one or more legal precedents, rules, tests, principles, doctrines, or policies. This Article mends supplementing this standard approach with fully legitimate and appropriate attention to what many cultures have long recognized as the four basic cardinal virtues of practical wisdom or reasonable prudence, courage or fortitude, temperance or reasonable self-restraint, and justice as the disposition to give everyone their due.

The Article illustrates the legitimacy and usefulness of this supplementary approach, with judicial attention being paid either to government actors or to some broader public, in a range of important constitutional cases.

Part of the justification for this Article’s mended approach is drawn directly from reflection on the case law, but the Article also draws upon philosophical discussions of the basic virtues from many cultures in order to address a number of possible critical concerns.

(Via: Mirror of Justice)